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Cyber Bullying In Schools and the Law:  
Is There an Effective Means of Addressing the Power Imbalance? 
 
Des Butler* 
Sally Kift**  
Marilyn Campbell***  
 
 
Cyber bullying – or bullying through the use of technology – is a growing phenomenon 
which is currently most commonly experienced by young people and the consequences 
manifested in schools.  Cyber bullying shares many of the same attributes as face-to-face 
bullying such as a power imbalance and a sense of helplessness on the part of the target.  
Not surprisingly, targets of face-to-face bullying are increasingly turning to the law, and 
it is likely that targets of cyber bullying may also do so in an appropriate case.  This 
article examines the various criminal, civil and vilification laws that may apply to cases 
of cyber bullying and assesses the likely effectiveness of these laws as a means of 
redressing that power imbalance between perpetrator and target. 
 
 
1. Introduction  
The ubiquity of modern telecommunications in the modern world has brought with it 
great benefits to society.  However, it also has its darker side.  This has included the 
phenomenon of ‘cyber bullying’ – a term coined by Canadian Bill Belsey to describe 
‘the use of information and communication technologies to support deliberate, 
repeated, and hostile behaviour by an individual or group, that is intended to harm 
others’.1  Cyber bullying is being experienced across different walks of life, although 
it is perhaps currently most prevalent amongst school students.  Indeed, for so-called 
‘Net-Gen’ – those who have been born since 1982 – electronic socialising and 
interactive communications are an integral part of their daily lives.2  Indeed, one 2005 
Canadian study found that 94% of children accessed the Internet from home, with 
some aged as young as Grade 4 being reliant on the Internet to network with their 
friends.  So is perhaps not surprising that what little research that has been done on 
cyber bullying to date has been focused primarily on these ‘digital natives’.3  
However, as technology continues to permeate all society and as the digital natives 
pass from adolescence to adulthood, there is reason to expect that cyber bullying may 
become more common in older age groups. 
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1 Bill Belsey, ‘Always on? Always aware!’ <www.cyberbullying.org> at 18 August 2008. 
2 D Oblinger and J Oblinger, ‘Is it Age or IT: First Steps Towards Understanding the Net Generation’ 
in D Oblinger and J Oblinger (eds), Educating the net generation.  EDUCAUSE. 
<http://www.educause.edu/educatingthenetgen/> at 18 August 2008. 
3 As author Marc Prensky has described this generation: see, eg, Marc Prensky, ‘Digital Natives, 
Digital Immigrants’ (2001) 9(5) On the Horizon 1. 
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The potential is clear for technologies such as on-line social network sites like 
MySpace and Facebook, discussion boards, on-line forums, blogs, wikis and e-mail as 
well as the now ubiquitous mobile phone to be used as a means of mala fides against 
other users.  The potential for the misuse of the Internet by deviant adult predators has 
been widely publicised and well understood.  However, there is only growing 
realisation that hostile behaviour utilising technology can also have serious and long 
lasting effects on its targets. Victims of bullying of any kind typically feel powerless 
to repel or fight back against their aggressors.  Cyber bullying adds a new dimension 
to this powerlessness with its ability to reach the target 24 hours a day, 7 days a week.  
Now a target cannot even rely on his or her home as a safe haven from bullying 
behaviour. 
 
Increasingly victims of bullying are turning to law, both civil and criminal, as a means 
of addressing the power imbalance between them and their bullies, or at least of 
obtaining some form of vindication.  While this might seem an extreme response to 
conduct that might be considered by some to be trivial or ‘just a joke’, the potential 
harm that victims may suffer makes the effectiveness of the various laws that may be 
called into play worthy of scrutiny. 
 
2. Cyber bullying and its effects  
 
2.1 Concepts of cyber bullying 
Cyber bullying may be defined by examples of how technology is used in bullying. 
An associated question is whether concepts applicable to traditional face-to-face 
bullying apply equally to cyber bullying, or whether the use of technology to bully 
requires fresh thinking.  This question is not helped by the fact that sociological 
researchers do not even agree on the definition of face-to-face bullying.  Nevertheless, 
most researchers agree that bullying per se is a form of aggression which has at least 
four underlying features.  On examination, these concepts at least would seem to be 
capable of extending to cyber bullying. 
 
First, the perpetrator intends to hurt the target, whether emotionally or physically.  
Bullying cannot be accidental.  An intention to hurt would seem to be the present also 
in cyber bullying.  Secondly, traditional concepts of bullying include the notion of an 
imbalance of power.  Usually in face-to-face bullying, the bully has a power 
differential because of size, age or position.  By contrast, in the case of cyber bullying 
the bully often chooses to remain anonymous.  This might be thought to negate any 
sense of power imbalance, since the target cannot perceive that he or she is less 
powerful if he or she does not know the identity and attributes of the other person.  
However, it can be argued that the very act of bullying, creates an imbalance of 
power.   Moreover, the bully’s anonymity in itself places the target at a disadvantage 
and invests the bully with a measure of power over the target. 
 
The third underlying concept of face-to-face bullying is the repetition or continued 
threat of further aggression.  Both perpetrator and target believe the aggression will be 
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sustained, thereby causing the target continuing agitation or fear.   This notion would 
seem to be readily transferable to cyber bullying.  Technology provides easy means to 
rain a seemingly ceaseless barrage of hostility upon the target.  Finally, targets of 
face-to-face bullying are typically unable to defend themselves, or unable to fight 
back as they feel helplessness, hurt and shame.  Due to the global reach of technology  
and supported by the usual anonymity of the aggressor, targets of cyber bullying are 
no less powerless to respond to intimidation than, for example, a physically weaker 
target is at a disadvantage and powerless to respond to the physical blows of a face-to-
face bully. 
 
2.2  Incidence of cyber bullying 
There is as yet scant published research on the incidence of cyber bullying. Much of 
the research that has been done concerns the cyber bullying of adolescents. This is 
perhaps understandable since this is the first generation born which only knows of a 
world linked by digital technology.  One Canadian study in 2006 found that 24.9% of 
adolescents reported they have been cyber bullied.4  This compares to a 2005 study in 
Australia that placed the incidence at only 14%5  and a 2004 North American study6 
that found only 7% reported to have been victimised. Other research shows an 
apparent increase from 25% of young people reporting being targets of cyber bullying 
in 20027 to a figure of 35% in 2005.8  A factor hampering any meaningful comparison 
between these studies is the tendency of researchers to use varying definitions of 
cyber bullying which often include all forms of aggression and which do not conform 
to commonly understood concepts of bullying. Perhaps the best that can be said is that 
the current incidence of cyber bullying seems to be about 20% of adolescents.9  
 
An open question is whether boys or girls are cyber bullied more, although one study 
found no differences.10  It also is not known whether someone who cyber bullies also 
engages in face-to-face bullying.  The same study found that 64% of cyber bullies 
admitted to also bullying face-to-face.  
                                                
4 Qing Li, ‘Cyber Bullying in Schools: A Research of Gender Differences’ (2006) 27(2) School 
Psychology International 157. 
5 Marilyn Campbell, ‘Cyber Bullying: An Old Problem in a New Guise?’ (2005) 15 Australian Journal 
of Guidance and Counselling 68. 
6 Michele Ybarra and Kimberly Mitchell, ‘Youth Engaging in Online Harassment: Associations with 
Caregiver-child Relationships, Internet Use, and Personal Characteristics’ (2004) 27 Journal of 
Adolescence 319. 
7 NCH, ‘1 in 4 children are the victims of “on-line bullying”’ 
<http://www.nch.org.uk/information/index.php?i=237> at 23 August 2008.  This was one of the first 
studies of cyber bullying. 
8 Justin Patchin and Sameer Hinduja, ‘Bullies Move Beyond the Schoolyard: A Preliminary Look at 
Cyber Bullying’ (2006) 4(2) Youth Violence and Justice 148. 
9 Peter Smith, Jess Mahdavi, Manuel Carvalho and Neil Tippett, ‘An Investigation into Cyberbullying, 
Its Forms, Awareness and Impact, and the Relationship between Age and Gender in Cyber Bullying’ 
<http://anti-bullyingalliance.org.uk/downloads/pdf/cyberbullyingreportfinal230106_000.pdf> at 23 
August 2008; MSN Cyberbullying Report: Blogging, instant messaging and email bullying amongst 
today’s teens 
<http://www.msn.co.uk/img/specials/portal/cyberbullying/cyberbullying_tall_revised3.pdf> at 22 
August 2008 
10 Tanya Beran and Qing Li, ‘Cyber-harassment: A Study of a New Method for an Old Behaviour’ 
(2005) 32 Journal of Educational Computing Research 265. 
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2.3  Consequences of cyber bullying 
Little is yet known for sure about the consequences of cyber bullying.  There have 
been several media reports that have linked suicides with the decedents being 
identified as targets of cyber bullying.11  However, research into the effect of face-to-
face bullying on adolescents has shown that it can lead to increased levels of 
depression, anxiety and psychosomatic symptoms in victims.12  Research has also 
shown victims may suffer even more serious consequences including severe physical 
harm, self-harm attempts13 as well as the reported suicides.14   Students who are the 
targets of bullying may have greater interpersonal difficulties and feel socially 
ineffective,15 and have higher levels of absenteeism from school and lower academic 
competence, with ramifications for future careers.16   
 
While there is little research on the consequences of cyber bullying specifically, it 
may be that it could have even more serious consequences than face-to-face bullying 
due to the variety of attributes that may accentuate the impact of the behaviour.  
Depending on the particular circumstances, this may include a wider audience, 
anonymity of the bully, the more enduring nature of the written word and the ability 
to reach the target at any time and in any place, including the target’s home. Further, 
cyber bullies may feel emboldened because they cannot see their targets or their 
immediate responses, and believe that, because of their anonymity, they will not be 
detected. It has been suggested that this anonymity may increase the intensity of the 
attacks and encourage them to continue for longer than they would otherwise do face-
to-face.17 While it is true that cyber bullying can only threaten physical violence 
rather than inflict it, research has shown that verbal and psychological bullying may 
have more negative long term effects.18   
 
3. The law’s response 
 
                                                
11 Kacy Marshall, ‘The “always on” generation: School liability and Preventative Measures for Cyber-
bullying.’ Education Labor Letter 
<www.laborlawyers.com/CM/Education%20Labor20%Letters/EducationLaborLetter498.asp> at 23 
August 2008. 
12 Riittakerttu Kaltiala-Heino, Matti Rimpela, Päivi Rantanen, and Arja Rimpela, ‘Bullying at School – 
An Indicator of Adolescents at Risk for Mental Disorders’ (2000) 23 Journal of Adolescence 661; 
Riittakerttu Kumpulainen et al, ‘Bullying and Psychiatric Symptoms Among Elementary School 
Children’ (1998) 22 Child Abuse and Neglect 705. 
13 C Coggan, S Bennett, R Hooper and P Dickinson, ‘Association between Bullying and Mental Health 
Status in New Zealand Adolescents’ (2003) 5 International Journal of Mental Health Promotion 16. 
14 Riittakerttu Kumpulainen et al, n 12; Ken Rigby and Phillip Slee, ‘Suicidal ideation among 
adolescent schoolchildren, involvement in bully/victim problems and perceived low social support. 
(1999) 29 Suicide and Life-Threatening Behaviour 119. 
15 WM Craig, ‘The Relationship Among Bullying, Victimisation, Depression, Anxiety, and Aggression 
in Elementary School Children’ (1998) 24Personality and Individual Differences 123. 
16 Ken Rigby, ‘What Children Tell Us About Bullying in Schools.’ (1997) 22(2) Children Australia 28. 
17 Kathleen Conn Bullying and harassment: A legal guide for educators (Alexandria: ASCD, 2004). 
18 Philippa Reid, Jeremy Monsen, and Ian Rivers, ‘Psychology's contribution to understanding and 
managing bullying within schools’ (2004) 20(3) Educational Psychology in Practice 241.  
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In many respects the law has struggled to keep apace with advances in technology.  
The problem of cyber bullying is no different.  While there is yet to be a case of cyber 
bullying reach an Australian court, such an eventuality is readily conceivable.  It is 
not difficult to reconceptualise cyber bullying in terms of criminal, tortious or 
vilifying behaviour. 
 
3.1 Cyber bullying as a criminal offence 
It may seem to some that a criminal prosecution would be an extreme response to 
bullying behaviour.  In the first place, the Director of Public Prosecutions may be 
dubious in a given instance that a case can be established beyond reasonable doubt, 
particularly with respect to the necessary intention to commit the relevant crime.  
Nevertheless, even where there is such reticence on the part of the prosecuting 
authority, targets of cyber bullying may find that the very involvement of a police 
investigation helps them to regain a sense of control and power otherwise lost to the 
bully.  Examination of the range of criminal offences that may be relevant is therefore 
warranted. 
 
3.1.1 Criminal responsibility 
A threshold question when considering the criminality of behaviour is whether the 
offender is deemed by law to be responsible for his or her actions.  In the case of 
young perpetrators it might be thought that they lack the same ability to appreciate the 
consequences of their behaviour, empathy for others and ability to control their 
impulses that might be reasonably expected of adults.  Irrespective of such 
considerations, criminal responsibility is determined solely on the basis of age. 
 
At common law, the age of criminal responsibility is 7 years. This age has been raised 
by statute in all Australian jurisdictions to 10 years, meaning a cyber bully under 10 
will never be criminally liable, while those aged between 10 and 14 years may be 
criminally responsible if the prosecution can prove beyond reasonable doubt that the 
child knew he or she ought not to have committed the offence.  In other words, it must 
be shown that the child knew that it was a wrong act of some seriousness, as distinct 
from an act of mere ‘naughtiness or childish mischief’.19 By contrast, anyone aged 14 
and over is deemed to have the requisite capacity and is thus criminally liable for his 
or her conduct.  
 
3.1.2 Offences 
New South Wales is the only Australian jurisdiction to enact legislation specifically 
directed at bullying in schools (which would in its terms include cyber bullying),20 
unlike, for example, the United States where sixteen states including New York, 
                                                
19 C v DPP [1996] 1 AC 1 and see Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) s 7(1),(2); Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) ss 
4M, 4N; Criminal Code Act 2002 (ACT) ss 25-26; Children (Criminal Proceedings) Act 1987 (NSW) s 
5; Criminal Code (NT) ss 38(1),(2); Criminal Code 1899 (QLD) s 29(1),(2); Criminal Code Act 1924 
(Tas) s 18(1),(2); Children and Young Persons Act 1989 (VIC) s 127; Criminal Code Act Compilation 
Act 1913 (WA) s 29.  
20 Crimes Act 1900 (NSW), Div 8B. 
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California and Illinois have statutory responses.21 Nevertheless, cyber bullying may 
easily be conceived in terms of well know criminal offences such as assault, threats, 
extortion, stalking, harassment, and indecent conduct.  In addition, an increasing array 
of new offences, such as torture, voyeurism, cyber stalking, and telecommunications 
offences may be relevant.  The New South Wales provisions and some of these other 
offences as they apply to cyber bullying are worth closer examination. 
 
(a) Assaults, intimidation and harassment at school (New South Wales) 
The Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) was amended by the Crimes Amendment (School 
Protection) Act 2002 (NSW) (commenced February 2003) to make it an offence in s 
60E where a person ‘assaults, stalks, harasses or intimidates’ any school staff or 
student while attending the school.  None of the terms ‘assault’, ‘stalk’, ‘harass’ or 
‘intimidate’ are specifically defined, but on their natural meaning would include cyber 
bullying. 
 
This section is unique in the Australian criminal law, but is limited in its reach to staff 
and students while ‘attending the school’, which is defined in s 60D(2) as follows: 
 
(a) while the student or member of staff is on school premises for the 
purposes of school work or duty (even if not engaged in school work 
or duty at the time), or  
(b)  while the student or member of staff is on school premises for the 
purposes of before school or after school child care, or  
(c)  while entering or leaving school premises in connection with school 
work or duty or before school or after school care.  
 
This limitation is significant.  Even in the case of face-to-face bullying, it does not 
cover hostile behaviour directed against student or staff members while they are on 
the way to, or home from, school (as opposed to actually entering or leaving school 
premises).  Much less does it cover cyber bullying occurring while the target is away 
from school premises.  It does not even cover cyber bullying performed by a bully 
who is on school premises, perhaps even using school computer equipment, against a 
target who is not on school premises.  Such a position is made even more absurd in a 
case in which the target is not on school premises because, for example, he or she is at 
home trying to recuperate from bullying behaviour directed at him or her while on 
school premises. 
 
(b) Assault 
                                                
21 The relevant states are Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Georgia, Illinois, Louisiana, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, 
and West Virginia: see the discussion in Fred Hartmeister and Vickie Fix-Turkowski, ‘Getting Even 
with Schoolyard Bullies: Legislative Responses to Campus Provocateurs’ (2005) 195 Educ L Rep 1, 5-
6.  
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A common assault may be committed by the threat of force which puts the target in 
fear of imminent violence.22  Actual direct or indirect application of force is not 
necessary.23  This offence exists in all States and Territories.24 There are minor 
differences in the elements of the offence between jurisdictions but, generally it is 
required that: 
 
 the offender attempt or threaten to apply force,  
 the threat must be evidenced in some way and  
 the threat creates an apprehension in the victim of present or immediate harm by 
reason of the offender apparent ability to carrying out the threat.  
 
These elements might easily be satisfied in a cyber bullying case such as where, for 
example, a child receives an SMS message threatening that a gang is coming to kill 
him or her.  However, under the Queensland, Tasmania and Western Australia 
statutes words or images online are insufficient evidence of a threat.25 
 
All jurisdictions also provide criminal sanctions where an assault causes some form of 
criminal harm, although this is variously described in the various statutes as 
‘grievous’, ‘bodily’, ‘actual bodily’ or ‘serious’.  A relevant question in this 
connection is whether ‘harm’ includes psychological harm, as cyber bullying is apt to 
produce.  In England the House of Lords has held that ‘bodily harm’ for the purposes 
of common law criminal law included mental harm or psychiatric injury provided the 
latter amounted to a ‘recognisable psychiatric illness’ such as clinical anxiety  or 
prolonged depression.26  Taking a lead from the law concerning civil liability for 
psychiatric injury caused by negligence, it was held that the term ‘bodily harm’, as 
used in the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 (UK), ‘must be interpreted in the 
light of the best current scientific appreciation of the link between the body and 
psychiatric injury’.27  Australian courts have similarly been prepared to recognise 
                                                
22 Stephens v Myers (1830) 4 C&P 349 at 349-350. 
23 The modern day criminal offence of assault, as now legislated in all Australian states and territories, 
is essentially a merger of the common law offences of ‘assault’ (the offer or threat of force coupled 
with the apparent present ability to carry out that threat) and ‘battery’ (the intentional application of 
force on another). See Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 26, 26A; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61; Criminal 
Code 1983 (NT) ss 187(b), 188; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 245, 335; Criminal Law Consolidation 
Act 1935 (SA) s 20; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 182(1), 184; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 31; 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 222, 313. 
24 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) ss 26, 26A; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 61; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss 
187(b), 188; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 245, 335; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20; 
Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 182(1), 184; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 31; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) 
ss 222, 313. 
25 Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 182(2) provides that words alone cannot constitute an assault. 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 245 and Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 222 both refer to ‘threatening by 
physical gestures’, which would seem to preclude online words or images being sufficient. Cf Criminal 
Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 20(1)(c) which specifically includes ‘threatens by words or 
conduct’; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss 187(b) providing that the threat may be ‘evidenced by bodily 
movement or threatening words’. At common law words are sufficient (see R v Ireland; R v Burstow 
[1998] AC147 where it was held that a series of silent telephone calls could amount to common law 
assault; see also Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWLR 451; Marchioro v Miller [1962] SASR 233).  
26 R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147, 159; see also R v Chan-Fook [1994] 2 All ER 552, 559. 
27 R v Ireland; R v Burstow [1998] AC 147, 159, per Lord Steyn. 
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psychiatric injury as a form of damage warranting compensation, and it would not be 
surprising to see a similar interpretation applied to criminal statutes in this country.  
This would mean that a criminal offence may be committed where cyber bullying 
causes its target to suffer a recognisable psychiatric illness. 
 
(c) Misuse of telecommunications services 
The Commonwealth Criminal Code Act 1995 contains a number of offences which 
may be effective means of redress against a cyber bully who misuses 
telecommunication services to menace, threaten or hoax other persons.  Section 
474.17 makes it an offence to use telecommunication services to menace, harass or 
cause offence (punishable by 3 years). It does not matter whether the menace or threat 
is caused by the type of use (such as multiple postings on a website) or by the content 
of the communication or both, provided reasonable persons would regard the use as 
being menacing, harassing or offensive in all the circumstances. 
 
Where the threat goes further and contains a threat to kill or cause harm, an offence 
under s 474.15 may be committed.  This section provides that it is an offence for a 
person to use telecommunication services, including the Internet, to threaten to kill 
(punishable by 10 years imprisonment) or to cause serious harm (punishable by 7 
years) to another person (such as the target) or to a third person, if the bully intends 
the target to fear that the threat will be carried out. ‘Fear’ is defined broadly in the Act 
to include apprehension, while ‘threat’ is defined as including ‘a threat made by any 
conduct, whether express or implied and whether conditional or unconditional.’ It is 
not necessary for the target to actually fear that the threat will be carried out, just that 
it be intended to be so.28 This is a significant point since most bullies intend that their 
targets are fearful, and there have been numerous reported cases of death threats and 
threats of serious harm being made in the cyber bullying context (most commonly by 
email or text message).29 
 
Additional offences in the Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth) that may be relevant to 
cyber bullying include s 474.16, which makes it an offence for a person to send a 
hoax communication intending to induce a false belief that an explosive has been left 
somewhere (punishable by 10 years imprisonment) and s 474.22, which prohibits 
using a carriage service for child abuse material.  The latter section may catch posting 
video of sexual assault and other abuse like the incongruously-named ‘happy 
slapping’, in which an unsuspecting victim is assaulted while an accomplice films the 
attack, often with a mobile phone, and distributes the video via a website.30  
 
(d) Other threat offences 
All Australian States and Territories have their own threat offences which mirror the 
Commonwealth threat provisions.  These may apply where the cyber bullying does 
                                                
28 See s 474.15(3) 
29 MSN Cyberbullying Report, above n 9. 
30 Michael Shaw, ‘Bullies Film Fights by Phone’, The Times: Educational Supplement 21 January  
2005,  3. 
Des Butler, Sally Kift & Marilyn Campbell    Cyber Bullying In Schools and the Law 
 
eLaw Journal: Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law (2009) 16(1)  9 
not result in physical injury but puts the target in fear of personal violence against him 
or her.  For example, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 31 makes it an offence to maliciously 
send or deliver, or cause to be received, any document threatening to kill or inflict 
bodily harm.31 Less serious threat offences are also provided for in all Australian 
jurisdictions, variously prohibiting a cyber bully from threatening to harm, injure or 
endanger a target to varying levels of gravity.32  
 
British Columbia provides an example of the successful prosecution of bullies 
uttering threats to cause death or serious bodily harm.  In the associated cases R v DW 
and KPD33 and R v DH34 the bullying, which including telephone calls, involved 
threats like ‘I am going to beat you up’ and ‘You’re dead’ directed at a girl called 
Dawn Wesley by her Grade 9 classmates.  She later committed suicide, leaving a note 
attributing her actions to the relentless bullying.  In R v DW and KPD, Rounthwaite 
CJ held that ‘bodily harm’ included ‘psychological hurt or injury, as well as physical’ 
and found that conditional or future threats were included in the ambit of the relevant 
offence.35 
 
(e) Stalking and harassment 
The last decade has seen a proliferation of anti-stalking, intimidation and harassment 
legislation both in Australia and overseas.  All Australian jurisdictions now have 
stalking legislation proscribing behaviour calculated to harass, threaten or 
intimidate.36 Stalking has been described as the ‘pursuit by one person of what 
appears to be a campaign of harassment or molestation of another.’37 Common 
examples include following the target, sending articles to the target, waiting outside or 
driving past the target’s home or place of work, and repeated contact by phone, email 
or text.  These offences have proven extremely valuable as part of a larger strategy to 
contain domestic violence and like behaviours where an imbalance of power is 
exploited in quite unimaginable and bizarre, but extremely frightening, ways.  They 
are therefore of particular relevance to cyber bullying where, like all cases of 
bullying, there is a similar exploitation of power imbalance.   
 
                                                
31 See Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 308, Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 163 (threats to kill in writing); 
Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 338A-338B; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 30; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 20; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) ss 19(1), 19(3); Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 166 (threats 
constituted by words or conduct). 
32 For example, Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 31, 199; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 31; Criminal Code 1913 
(WA) ss 338(a),(b),(d), 338B; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 200; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 359; 
Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19(2).  
33 [2002] BCPC 0096. 
34 [2002] BCPC 0464. 
35 [2002] BCPC 0096 at [13]. 
36 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 359A; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) ss 338D, 338E; Crimes Act 1900 
(NSW) s 545B (intimidation or annoyance by violence or otherwise); Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) s 21A; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 19AA; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 192, 192A; 
Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 189; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35; Crimes (Domestic and Personal 
Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) ss 8, 13. 
37 Celia Wells, ‘Stalking: The Criminal Law Response’ [1997] Criminal Law Review 463, 466; Sally 
Kift, ‘Stalking in Queensland: From the Nineties to Y2K’ (1999) Bond Law Review, 11(1), 144. 
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Each of the State and Territory sections contains lengthy, inclusive lists of the types 
of conduct caught, although there are minor differences in these lists.  The anti-
stalking law in Crimes Act 1958 (Vic), s 21A is the one of the most detailed, covering 
a person who engages in a course of conduct (i.e. at least two occasions) which 
includes, amongst several other forms of conduct, telephoning, sending electronic 
messages or otherwise contacting the victim. The conduct must be done with the 
intention of causing physical or mental harm or arousing apprehension or fear and 
actually have that result.  The Queensland law is also very wide.  Under the 
Queensland Criminal Code s 359B ‘unlawful stalking’ means contacting a person in 
any way, including, for example, by telephone, mail, fax, e-mail or through the use of 
any technology, loitering near, leaving offensive material and other types of behaviour 
that would cause the stalked person fear of violence or property damage or cause 
detriment to the stalked person or another person (emphasis added). ‘Detriment’ is 
defined to include apprehension or fear of violence and serious mental, psychological 
and emotional harm,38 as is often the case with cyber bullying. It is significant that the 
section applies to conduct engaged in on ‘any 1 occasion’ if the conduct is protracted. 
 
Legislation in other jurisdictions refers to a person who on at least two occasions 
stalks another, intending to cause physical or mental harm to that other person or to a 
third person, or intending to cause apprehension or fear, with ‘stalking’ including 
conduct involving following, loitering outside where the other person is, interfering 
with property of the other person, keeping the other person under surveillance or 
acting in any other way that could reasonably be expected to arouse the other person's 
apprehension or fear (emphasis added).39 Cyberbullying would constitute ‘acting in 
any other way’. Tasmania, like Queensland, specifically includes ‘contacting’ the 
target as an identified form of stalking,40 which would embrace cyber bullying.  In 
Western Australia the offence is simply expressed in terms of a person who ‘pursues 
another person with intent to intimidate that person or a third person’.41   
 
By contrast, the New South Wales legislation now proscribes ‘stalking or intimidation 
with intent to cause fear of physical or mental harm’ very broadly in the newly 
enacted Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 200742 while also retaining an 
offence of ‘intimidation of annoyance’ in the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 545B. The 
latter provision makes it an offence to use violence or intimidation to or toward 
another person, or that person’s spouse, child, or dependant. ‘Intimidation’ is further 
defined as causing a reasonable apprehension of injury, which may be in respect of 
that person’s property, business, occupation, employment, or other source of income.  
‘Injury’ is also said to include ‘any actionable wrong of any nature’.  Arguably, 
therefore, it might also cover damage to reputation (which might otherwise found an 
action for defamation) or disclosure of personal information (which might otherwise 
                                                
38 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 359A 
39 See Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 35; Criminal Code (NT) s 189; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 
(SA) s 19AA. 
40 Criminal Code (Tas) s 192(1). 
41 Criminal Code (WA) s 338E. 
42 Crimes (Domestic and Personal Violence) Act 2007 (NSW) ss 8, 13.. 
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found an action for breach of confidentiality, or perhaps invasion of privacy)43 which 
are potential consequences of some forms of cyber bullying. 
 
The anti-stalking legislation has a number of advantages as a means of addressing 
cyber bullying.  First, a wide range of hostile behaviour falls within its ambit which in 
itself need not be criminal.44  For example, a threat which is merely implicit rather 
than explicit would still be caught.  Secondly, while there are differences between 
jurisdictions in relation to the offender’s requisite intent and the required state of mind 
(if any) of the victim, it is usually sufficient that the offender, by means of repeated 
conduct (other than in Queensland, which refers to ‘at least one occasion’), intends to 
induce in the target an apprehension or fear of violence or harm (which in most 
Australian jurisdictions includes the intention to cause the target either physical or 
mental harm). Accordingly this offence is well suited to cases of cyber bullying, 
where the purpose is normally to cause emotional, rather than physical, harm and 
distress.  
 
(f) Torture 
Queensland and the ACT have both enacted law prohibiting torture.45  These offences 
are primarily designed to outlaw the infliction of pain for coercion, punishment, 
obtaining information or perhaps deviant pleasure.46  However, the wording of the 
Queensland section may be wide enough to catch bullying, including cyber bullying.  
It defines ‘torture’ as the ‘intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering on a person 
by an act or series of acts done on 1 or more than 1 occasion’, and ‘pain or suffering’ 
as including physical, mental, psychological or emotional pain or suffering, whether 
temporary or permanent.  As bullying (and by extension cyber bullying), on any 
sociological conception includes the intent to cause the target emotional or 
psychological harm and a repetition of the behaviour, it therefore meets the definition 
of torture.  Naturally, whether the prosecuting authorities would be prepared to view a 
case of cyber bullying in such a light is another question.  However, the possibility 
cannot be discounted if appropriate circumstances presented themselves. 
 
(g) Visual recording, ‘upskirting’ and breach of privacy 
Some jurisdictions have responded to voyeuristic behaviour involving the 
surreptitious use of mobile phone camera and other miniature cameras to photograph 
unsuspecting people involved in private activities or of their private parts (for 
example, the practice known as ‘upskirting’ where an image is taken covertly looking 
under a woman’s skirt).  These jurisdictions have prohibited non-consensual visual 
recordings of a target when the latter is engaged in a private act or in a private place 
(such as showering or toileting at work or school) and the distribution of those 
                                                
43 See section 3.2.1(c) below. 
44 R v Clarke  Unreported Queensland District Court, Ipswich, 27/2/95 (Robertson DCJ). 
45 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld), s 320A; Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 36. 
46 The ACT provision is expressly limited to public employees or their accomplices using torture for 
the purposes of obtaining information, punishment, intimidation or coercion, or discrimination: see s 
36.  
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recordings (for example, by posting on a web site).47  When it is considered that such 
behaviour may result in severe emotional and psychological harm to the target, the 
application of these provisions in the context of cyber bullying is readily apparent. 
 
(h) Criminal defamation 
Derogatory or denigrating material that is published to others, perhaps by way of a 
web site, may constitute civil defamation of the target.48  It might also constitute a 
criminal defamation.  In Australia the common law offence of criminal libel subsists 
in Victoria, but has been abolished elsewhere and replaced by a statutory offence, 
generally called ‘criminal defamation’.49  Even in Victoria there is a statutory offence 
of publishing false ‘defamatory libel’ that complements the common law.50 
The statutory offences in New South Wales, Queensland, South Australia, Tasmania, 
Western Australia and the ACT introduced a requirement of mens rea as an element 
of the offence. In other words, the prosecution must show both knowledge of falsity 
and an intention to cause serious harm or reckless indifference.51  In the absence of 
admissions by the accused, each fact must be proved by inference.52  In the Northern 
Territory the element of mens rea was introduced by setting out a requisite intention 
for which the defamatory matter was published, namely: 
(a) with intent to cause or that causes or is likely to cause a breach of the peace;  
(b) with intent to cause loss;  
(c) with intent to interfere with the free and informed exercise of a political right;  
(d) with intent to prevent or deter a person from performing any duty imposed on him by law;  
(e) with intent to prevent or deter any person from doing any act that he is lawfully entitled to 
do or to compel him to do any act that he is lawfully entitled to abstain from doing;  
(f) with intent to prevent any lawful investigation or inquiry; or  
(g) with intent to interfere with or to influence any judicial proceeding.53 
  
Moreover, intent need not be shown in the Northern Territory where a publication 
actually causes or is likely to cause a breach of the peace. In Victoria there are two 
offences following the enactment of an offence of publication of defamatory matter 
knowing it to be false, which stands alongside the continued operation of the common 
law criminal libel which does not require an intention to defame or knowledge of 
falsity.54 
 
                                                
47 Summary Offences Act 1988 (NSW) ss 21G, 21H; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 227A, 227B; see 
also Criminal Code (Canada) s 162; Sexual Offences Act 2003 (UK) s 67; Crimes Act 1961 (NZ) ss 
216H, 216J; Video Voyeurism Act 18 USC §1801(a) (2004). 
48 See section 3.2.1(d) below. 
49 Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 439; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 529; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) s 204; 
Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 365; Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 257; Criminal Code 
Act 1924 (Tas) s 196; Criminal Code 1913 (WA) s 345. 
50 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic) s 10. 
51 Crimes Act (ACT), s 439(1); Crimes Act 1900  (NSW), s 529(3); Criminal Code 1899 (Qld),  s 365 
(1) (knowledge and either intention or ‘without having regard’); Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 
(SA) s 257(1) (knowledge or reckless as to whether true or false, and intention to cause serious harm or 
reckless indifference); Criminal Code 1924 (Tas), s 196(1) (knowledge and either intention or ‘without 
having regard’); Criminal Code 1913 (WA), s 345(1) (knowledge or without having regard as to true or 
false, and intention to cause serious harm or ‘without having regard’). 
52 Waterhouse v Gilmore (1988) 12 NSWLR 270 at 290. 
53 Criminal Code 1983 (NT), s 204. 
54 Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 10(1); see the analysis in King v R (1876) 2 VLR 17 at 20.  
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Otherwise, most jurisdictions import the meaning of elements like ‘publish’ and 
‘defamatory matter’ from law of tort for the purposes of the criminal offence.55  
 
Prosecutions for criminal defamation are rare, prosecuting authorities usually taking 
the attitude that vindication of reputation is best left a matter to be determined civilly 
between the parties.  Nevertheless, they are possible.56  It is conceivable, then, that 
cyber bullying may involve a degree of denigration that reaches such a level of 
criminality that it warrants prosecution by the State. 
 
(i) Accessorial liability 
All jurisdictions prohibit a person from being a party to an offence, for example, by 
aiding, counselling or procuring a criminal offence.57  There are numerous ways that 
such provisions may be involved in a case of cyber bullying.  One situation in 
particular where the provisions may prove useful would be a case of ‘happy slapping’, 
where the assault on the unsuspecting victim is filmed by an accomplice before being 
uploaded to the Internet.  Thus, while the initial assault may be thought of in terms of 
face-to-face bullying, the accomplice, in recording and then distributing the footage 
with the intent of causing greater emotional harm to the target, also engages in cyber 
bullying. 
 
3.1.3 Criminal injuries compensation 
Where a bullying target suffers an injury or injuries as a result of a criminal offence 
against the person, it is possible for that person, as a ‘victim of crime’, to seek 
criminal injuries compensation for the injury suffered as a result of the act(s) of 
violence committed against them. Each state and territory has its own legislative 
scheme for compensating victims of crime,58 though the victims’ eligibility, the 
amount payable, the procedural requirements (including time limits), and the precise 
legislative scheme applicable will depend on the date of the crime committed and the 
type of injury inflicted. While the legislative responses in Australia are far from 
uniform, at a very broad level of generalisation it may be said that they provide 
compensation for personal injury (both physical and mental injury), but not for 
property loss or damage. Thus, there is the possibility that a target victim might 
recover criminal compensation for the bullying injury suffered, to a modest, 
prescribed monetary level. Commonly, a criminal injury compensation application 
requires the offender’s conviction on indictment. Most states now provide a 
                                                
55 See Crimes Act 1900 (ACT) s 439(8); Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 529(11); Criminal Code 1983 (NT) 
s 203; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 365(8); Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) s 196(7); Criminal Code 
1913 (WA) s 345(7).  The South Australian statute does not define ‘publish.’ 
56 See, eg, Spautz v Williams [1983] 2 NSWLR 506; Gypsy Fire v Truth Newspapers Pty Ltd (1987) 9 
NSWLR 382; Waterhouse v Gilmore (1988) 12 NSWLR 270; Grassby v R (1992) 62 A Crim R 351. 
57 Criminal Code 2002 (ACT) ss 45-47; Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) ss 345-351B; Crimes Act 1958 (Vic) 
ss 323-325; Criminal Code 1983 (NT) ss 8-10, 12-13, 43BG; Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) ss 7-9; 
Criminal Law Consolidation Act 1935 (SA) s 276; Criminal Code Act 1924 (Tas) ss 3-5; Criminal 
Code 1913 (WA) ss 7-9; Criminal Code 1995 (Cth) ss 11.2, 11.4. 
58 Victims of Crime Act 2001 (SA); Victims of Crime Compensation Act 1994 (Tas); Criminal Offence 
Victims Act 1995 (Qld); Victims of Crime Assistance Act 1996 (Vic); Victims Support and 
Rehabilitation Act 1996 (NSW); Crimes (Victims Assistance) Act 1983 (NT); Criminal Injuries 
Compensation Act 2003 (WA); Victims of Crime (Financial Assistance) Act 1983 (ACT). 
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mechanism whereby, should the offender be unable to pay the amount ordered, a 
further application may be made to the state for an ‘ex gratia’ payment. Some 
jurisdictions also provide for a compensation or restitution order to be made against 
the offender at the time of sentencing, which may cover property damage.59   
 
An alternate course of action, should the offender have assets, is to pursue a civil 
action and recover damages. This will now be discussed.    
 
3.2 Cyber bullying as a ground for civil liability 
A target of cyber bullying may also seek compensation for the harm suffered from 
either the perpetrator or a third party deemed responsible for failing to take steps to 
prevent the hostile behaviour, such as the perpetrator’s school.60  Civil proceedings 
have the advantage that a case need only be proved on the balance of probabilities 
rather than on the criminal standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.  The 
disadvantage of civil action is the need for the target to have the financial resources to 
pursue an action.  In those cases where both a criminal offence has been committed 
and civil liability incurred, the target may seek to delay commencing civil 
proceedings until such time as criminal responsibility has been determined.  A finding 
of guilt on the higher criminal standard will mean that the circumstances should easily 
establish civil liability on the lesser civil standard, and in turn make pursuit of the 
civil claim easier. 
 
3.2.1 Perpetrator liability 
Consideration of a cyber bully’s civil liability, like his or her criminal liability, also 
involves threshold questions.  Unlike criminal law, age is no barrier to a civil liability 
to pay compensation for cyber bullying. As Windeyer J decided in McHale v Watson, 
the only question is whether the perpetrator ‘was old enough to know that his [or her] 
conduct was wrongful - that is to say if, in the common phrase, he [or she] was old 
enough to know better.’61  As long as this question can be answered in the affirmative, 
the perpetrator may be sued for reparation.  A different threshold question is perhaps 
more relevant: is the perpetrator worth suing?  There is little point in spending time 
and money obtaining a judgment against a perpetrator who has little in the way 
resources to meet any damages award. 
 
A natural question in the case of young perpetrator is whether an action may also be 
brought against his or her parents, and against whom there may be greater prospects 
of recovering a judgment debt.  In McHale v Watson Windeyer J also observed that: 
 
A parent is, generally speaking, not legally liable for the wrongdoing of his child. This is the 
rule of the common law. In other systems a different view is taken and parents are required by 
law to make good the harm that their children do. In our law that is so if the parent has in 
some way participated in, directed or ratified the wrongdoing of his child, or if the child were 
                                                
59 For example, Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 (Qld) s 35.  
60 See, eg, Cox v State of New South Wales (2007) 71 NSWLR 225. 
61 (1964) 111 CLR 384 at 386. 
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in fact employed as his servant and the wrongful act was done in the course of his 
employment. A parent may also be liable for the consequence of his child's wrongdoing if his 
own negligence caused or provided the occasion for it. In that case the parent is not 
vicariously liable: he is liable because of his own negligence. Such negligence may arise from 
his failure to exercise a reasonable control of the activities of his child. It may in some cases 
arise from his arming the child with an instrument which it could reasonably be thought might 
be used by the child in a manner that would be dangerous to other persons. Whatever acts or 
omissions of the parent be relied upon, they must amount to a breach of a duty of care created 
by the reasonably foreseeable risk of an injury arising as a consequence of those acts or 
omissions. Although I have spoken of the parent as ‘he’, a mother may of course be liable in 
the same way as a father.62 
 
It would be difficult to argue that the simple act by a parent of giving a child a mobile 
phone or a computer with access to the Internet constituted ‘arming the child with an 
instrument which it could reasonably be thought might be used by the child in a 
manner that would be dangerous to other persons’.  Any liability on the part of the 
parent would need to be on the basis of a 'failure to exercise a reasonable control of 
the activities' of the child which would 'amount to a breach of a duty of care created 
by the reasonably foreseeable risk of injury arising as a consequence of those acts or 
omissions' of the parent.  A plaintiff would need to argue, for example, that in the case 
of cyber bullying conducted on the perpetrator's home computer, a parent should 
exercise reasonable control by supervising the child's Internet usage.  The practicality 
of such a proposition, however, might be open to doubt.  Even if a parent locates the 
computer with access to the Internet in such a place in the home that permits 
supervision of Internet usage, it can be difficult, if not impossible, for even the most 
prudent parent to be completely sure of what the child is doing at all times.  Without 
an understanding of the full context, such a parent is not to know that a seemingly 
innocent message has a sinister connotation.  Further, the use of abbreviations, code 
words or slang can hide the true meaning of a message. 
 
A number of intention-based causes of action may be relevant in a cyber bullying 
context.  Some of these causes of action are the tortious counterparts to criminal 
offences. 
 
(a) Assault 
Cyber bullying in the form of threats of violence communicated by telephone or SMS 
message, or posted on a website, and which cause a target to apprehend violence may 
not only constitute a crime but also give rise to the tort of assault giving rise to a right 
to compensation. Like the crime, this form of trespass to person requires an act by the 
defendant which requires the plaintiff to apprehend immediate contact with his or her 
person.63  The plaintiff must believe on reasonable grounds that the person making the 
threat has the present means of carrying any threat of force into effect.  This may be 
easy to satisfy where the parties are in close proximity.  However, it has also been 
recognised that a plaintiff may be made to apprehend immediate physical violence in 
the case of threats made over the telephone.64  If, for example, a phone call, text 
                                                
62 McHale v Watson (1964) 111 CLR 384 at 386-387;  See also Smith v Leurs (1945) 70 CLR 256. 
63 See section 3.1.2(b). 
64 Barton v Armstrong [1969] 2 NSWR 451; Zanker v Vartzokas (1988) 34 A Crim R 314 at 318.   
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message or entry on a website, blog or wiki threatened that the target was going to be 
killed, bashed or the like in the very near future – perhaps during a recess break or 
after school – it may be that this requirement has been satisfied.  However, the more 
generalised any threat of violence, or the more remote the threat of violence from any 
likely infliction, the more difficult it may be to argue that the defendant has 
committed an assault. 
 
(b)  Intentional infliction of mental harm 
It has been noted that bullying entails the perpetrator intending to cause the target to 
suffer harm.  Consequently, a target of cyber bullying may have a claim based on the 
rule in Wilkinson v Downton (‘Wilkinson’)65 for the intentional infliction of physical 
harm. It is salient warning for bullies of any type who believe they are ‘having fun’ or 
playing a joke on the target that this case involved a practical joke gone wrong.  The 
defendant, by way of a practical joke, told the plaintiff that her husband had been 
involved in an accident and that she should hurry and take pillows to him. The 
plaintiff suffered psychological harm as a consequence, and the defendant was held 
legally responsible for this harm.  Similarly, in Janvier v Sweeney66 a defendant was 
held liable for threats against a woman and her fiancé which were uttered with the 
knowledge that they were likely to cause her injury due to her personality and which 
resulted in her suffering a psychiatric condition and a long period of illness.   This 
doctrine was formulated in an age when psychiatric injury was believed to be a form 
of physical harm.  It has been subsequently interpreted as being linked to psychiatric 
injury rather than harm in general, including physical harm per se.67   
 
The Wilkinson decision spawned a substantial body of jurisprudence in the United 
States concerning claims for ‘extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or 
recklessly causing severe emotional distress to another’.68  In Australia, Latham CJ in 
Bunyan v Jordan69 recognised that if a person ‘deliberately does an act of a kind 
calculated to cause physical injury ... and in fact causes physical injury to that other 
person, he is liable in damages.’70  It was held that ‘calculated’ meant objectively 
likely to happen. Latham CJ said of the words uttered in Wilkinson that ‘it was 
naturally to be expected that they might cause a very severe nervous shock.’71  More 
recently, in Northern Territory v Mengel72 it was said that Wilkinson illustrated ‘acts 
which are calculated in the ordinary course to cause harm ... or which are done with 
reckless indifference to the harm that is likely to ensue.’73 
 
However, in contrast to the American experience, the doctrine has not figured largely 
in Anglo-Australian case law.  The case was decided at a time when the Privy Council 
                                                
65 [1897] 2 QB 57. 
66 [1919] 2 KB 316. 
67 See, eg, Janvier v Sweeney [1919] 2 KB 316; Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474. 
68 See Restatement (Second) of Torts §46.  Indeed, the facts of both Wilkinson v Downton  and Janvier 
v Sweeney are used by the Restatement as illustrations of the application of the section. 
69 (1937) 57 CLR 1. 
70 Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1at 10. 
71 Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1at 11.  See also Dixon J at 17. 
72 (1995) 185 CLR 307. 
73 Northern Territory v Mengel (1995) 185 CLR 307 at 347. 
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in Victorian Railway Commissioners v Coultas74 was authority for the view that 
nervous shock was too remote a consequence of a negligent act to be a recoverable 
head of damage.  It was clearly evident that the decision in Wilkinson, by being based 
on intention, was an attempt to evade Coultas although its reliance on intention was 
dubious since Mr Downton in fact only intended to cause Mrs Wilkinson to suffer a 
fright, not any resulting illness.  An unanswered question, therefore, was whether the 
intention had to be actual or imputed.  With Coultas no longer good authority, 
Wilkinson itself is able to be comfortably accommodated by the law concerning 
nervous shock caused by negligence. Lord Hoffmann remarked in Wainwright v 
Home Office75 that in cases of psychiatric injury there is no point in seeking to rely on 
intention when negligence will do just as well, meaning that Wilkinson has been left 
with ‘no leading role in the modern law.’76   
 
Accordingly, it may be the case that a practical joke which is honestly well-
intentioned, although perhaps misguided, and which results in unintentional injury 
will now be treated as a case of negligence in appropriate circumstances. However, a 
distinguishing feature of bullying, no less of cyber bullying, is the specific intent to 
cause emotional harm.  If that emotional harm is of such a level that it amounts to a 
recognisable psychiatric illness then an action based on the rule in Wilkinson would 
seem well-suited as a means of reparation.  Targets of bullying seeking to use the law 
as a means of fighting back against their aggressors may yet breathe life into a 
doctrine thought past its usefulness. 
 
(c) Invasion of privacy 
Cyber bullying may invade the privacy of the target of that bullying in one of two 
ways: it may contain threatening material or it may give widespread publicity to 
private information concerning the target. In either case the contributions may result 
in the target suffering harm in the form of distress, embarrassment and/or humiliation.  
Whether the target has a cause of action for invasion of privacy per se is still a vexed 
question in Australia.  
 
For long Australian courts thought that dicta in the High Court case Victoria Park 
Racing and Recreation Grounds Co v Taylor77 meant that the common law in this 
country did not recognise a right to privacy.78  Instead any action for breach of 
privacy would need to be framed in terms of some other recognised cause of action 
such as trespass to land or breach of confidence.  The protection of privacy in this 
way is piecemeal, being dependent on the limitations of these other causes of action.  
For example, since the necessary title to sue for trespass is possession of the land, it 
would be of little use to adolescents who were cyber bullied at school or in their 
parents’ home.  However, the High Court in Australian Broadcasting Corporation v 
                                                
74 (1888) 13 App Cas 222. 
75 [2004] 2 AC 406. 
76 Wainwright v Home Office [2004] 2 AC 406 at [41].  A similar sentiment has been expressed in 
Australia: see, eg, Carrier v Bonham [2002] 1 Qd R 474 at 484 (McPherson JA, with whom McMurdo 
P and Moynihan J agreed) 
77 (1937) 58 CLR 479;  
78 See, eg, Cruise and Kidman v Southdown Press (1993) IPR 125 at 125. 
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Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd79 has now not dismissed the idea of a tort for breach of 
privacy.  While most of the judges were content to express the view that Victoria Park 
did not stand in the way of development of a common law protection of personal 
privacy,80 Callinan J was prepared to suggest that the time was ripe for Australian law 
to recognise such a cause of action.81  
 
This challenge has been taken up by two lower courts.  In the Queensland District 
Court case Grosse v Purvis82 a man was alleged to have stalked his former lover.  
Skoien SDCJ noted that in the case of most crimes against the person there was a 
corresponding civil cause of action which the victim of the crime was able to pursue 
against the perpetrator.  After finding that a criminal offence of stalking was made out 
on the facts, his Honour was prepared to recognise a civil claim for the invasion of the 
privacy for the victim of the stalking.  In taking this ‘bold step’ he drew on the 
American tort of the invasion of privacy, which has been described as in fact 
representing four separate torts: unreasonable intrusion upon of the plaintiff’s solitude 
or seclusion, public disclosure of private facts, portraying the plaintiff in a false light 
to the public, and appropriation of the plaintiff’s identity.83  His Honour envisaged the 
cause of action for invasion of privacy as having the following elements: 
 
(a)       a willed act by the defendant; 
(b)       which intrudes upon the privacy or seclusion of the plaintiff; 
(c) in a manner which would be considered highly offensive to a reasonable person of 
ordinary sensibilities; and 
(d) which causes the plaintiff detriment in the form of mental physiological or emotional harm 
or distress or which prevents or hinders the plaintiff from doing an act which she is 
lawfully entitled to do.84 
 
It may be argued that element (d) in this formulation is misguided, since as a direct 
and intentional act such an unreasonable intrusion would be a tort akin to trespass and 
therefore should be actionable per se.85  Nevertheless, such a tort would be well suited 
to cyber bullying behaviour.86 Indeed for targets who, by reason of technology, have 
been able to be bullied even in their homes and at any time of day, a tort designed to 
redress intrusions on a person’s seclusion or solitude would seem to be a cause of 
action par excellence. 
 
                                                
79 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
80 See Gummow and Hayne JJ (with whom Gaudron J agreed) at 248, Kirby J at 277. 
81 (2001) 208 CLR 199 at 338. 
82 [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706. 
83 See W Prosser, ‘Privacy’ (1960) 48 Cal LR 383 and Restatement (Second) of Torts §652A. 
84 Grosse v Purvis [2003] Aust Torts Reports ¶81-706 at 64,187.  Cf Giller v Procopets [2008] VSCA 
236 where, obiter, the Victorian Court of Appeal expressed a reluctance to recognise a tort of invasion 
of privacy.  
85 See Des Butler, ‘A Tort of Invasion of Privacy in Australia?’ (2005) 29 UMLR 339, 360. 
86 Such a tort may be seen as a development of the tort of harassment with which Australian courts 
have flirted in the past: see, eg, Chapman v Conservation Council of South Australia (2002) 82 SASR 
449, [154]; cf Wong v Parkside Health NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1721) 
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The challenge was also taken up with respect to the other form of invasion, disclosure 
of private facts, in the Victorian County Court in Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting 
Corporation.87  The case involved three ABC Radio news reports which contravened 
the statutory prohibition against publication of particulars identifying the victim of a 
sexual offence.  The victim, who had been raped twice by her husband, had suffered 
post traumatic stress disorder as a consequence but had made substantial progress 
toward dealing with the condition.  The broadcasts had a devastating impact on her, 
causing her to be re-traumatised and severely aggravating her condition.  Hampel J 
upheld the plaintiff’s claim on four bases: breach of statutory duty, a negligent 
infliction of psychiatric injury, breach of confidence and invasion of privacy.   
 
Hampel J ventured, after reference to Gleeson CJ’s suggestion in ABC v Lenah Game 
Meats88  that Australia might follow the English approach to breach of confidence as 
the appropriate cause of action for breach of privacy, to hold that the English 
approach as also representing the common law development of breach of confidence 
in Australia.89 This approach essentially involves fusing the traditional elements of the 
confidentiality action (information with a quality of confidentiality, obtained subject 
to an obligation of confidence, and actual or threatened use) into determining whether 
there was a reasonable expectation of privacy in the circumstances, and whether it is 
outweighed by the public interest in free speech.90  However, this approach has also 
been strongly influenced by the requirement under the Human Rights Act 1988 (UK), 
s 6(1) for English courts to take into account, so far as possible, The European 
Convention on Human Rights.  This convention recognises both a right to privacy and 
a right to free speech.  Australian law does not operate in such a context.  Australian 
courts have a strong history recognising that the basis of the action for breach of 
confidence is the obligation of conscience which binds the confidant,91 not the nature 
of the information.  Further, the orthodox Australian view is that while the 
administration of common law and equity has become fused, they are nevertheless 
based upon different systems of justice.92  There is significant doctrinal angst, 
therefore, in seeking to grant common law compensatory damages for an equitable 
cause of action. 
 
Hampel J used the same considerations for finding a breach of confidence to find that 
the plaintiff had established a claim for breach of privacy.  Her Honour found that an 
action could lie where there was an unjustified publication of personal information 
which the plaintiff had a reasonable expectation would remain private.  While such a 
finding represented, like Grosse v Purvis, a ‘bold step’ in development of the 
common law, it has the virtue of avoiding the doctrinal difficulties posed by trying to 
utilise an equitable doctrine to resolve a problem for which it was not designed.  It 
reflects the development of the common law by the New Zealand Court of Appeal in 
Hosking v Runting.93  In the process of recognising a common law claim for public 
                                                
87 [2007] VCC 281. 
88 (2001) 208 CLR 199. 
89 Ibid [110]. 
90 Campbell v MGN [2004] 2 AC 247; Douglas v Hello! Ltd [2008] 1 AC 1. 
91 See, eg, Moorgate Tobacco Ltd v Philip Morris Limited (No 2) (1984) 156 CLR 414 at 438; Johns v 
Australian Securities Commission (1993) 178 CLR 408. 
92 See, eg, Felton v Mulligan (1971) 124 CLR 367 at 392 
93 [2004] NZCA 34. 
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disclosure of private facts, the majority judgments94 noted that the absence of a broad 
right of privacy in the Bill of Rights did not prevent the courts from the incremental 
development of protection of aspects of privacy in appropriate circumstances.95  The 
leading majority judgment of Gault P and Blanchard J drew on American 
jurisprudence and endorsed two ‘fundamental requirements’ for a successful claim of 
interference with privacy: 
 
(1) the existence of facts in respect of which there is a reasonable expectation of privacy; 
and 
(2) publicity given to those private facts that would be considered highly offensive to an 
objective reasonable person.96 
 
In so doing they thought that the New Zealand cases were in effect very close to the 
position in the United Kingdom, except that in that country the matter had been dealt 
with by way of a modification of the action for breach of confidence, rather than as a 
separate head of liability.97 
 
Hampel J’s judgment in Jane Doe v Australian Broadcasting Commission might be 
seen as the first tentative step towards a similar development of the common law in 
this country.98  A tort designed to protect against public disclosure of private facts 
would seem ideally suited as a means of redressing information disseminated widely 
by a bully using technology in order to intimidate or humiliate, particularly in light of 
the ease with which information may be uploaded to the Internet.   
 
Targets of cyber bullying would be beneficiaries of a development of the common 
law to recognise that personal privacy may be protected by, depending on the 
circumstances, either a cause of action for unreasonable intrusion upon seclusion or a 
cause of action for public disclosure of private facts.  A separate tort or torts for 
invasion of privacy would not require the imminence of violence necessary for a 
tortious action for assault, or the long lasting diagnosable psychiatric illness required 
for a Wilkinson action. 
 
However, the incremental development of the law would inevitably leave pockets of 
uncertainty.  For this reason, and accepting that personal privacy should be protected, 
the Australian Law Reform Commission has now recommended a statutory cause of 
action for breach of privacy be enacted.99  Such a cause of action should be drawn 
generally, and apply where there was a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ and an 
invasion by ‘act or conduct [which] is highly offensive to a reasonable person of 
                                                
94 Gault P and Blanchard J (joint judgment) and Tipping J 
95 [2004] NZCA 34 at [96]. 
96 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34 at [117].  This was therefore akin to the formulation of the tort 
in the Second Restatement. 
97 Hosking v Runting [2004] NZCA 34 at [7].  See also Tipping J at [247]. 
98 The defendant appealed the trial judge decision but the action was subsequently settled. 
99 Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, 
Report 108 (2008) [74.112]-[74.198]; See also the discussion in New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, Invasion of Privacy, Consultation Paper 1 (2007) Chap 7.  
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ordinary sensibilities.’100  Such a statutory cause of action would embrace most, if not 
all, forms of cyber bullying. 
 
(d) Defamation 
Where the cyber bullying consists of uploading words or images onto internet web 
sites, chat rooms, bulletin boards, blogs or wikis which humiliate, embarrass or 
otherwise cause distress to the target, the target may have an action for defamation.    
Under the uniform regime of defamation legislation recently enacted by all 
jurisdictions in Australia, the common law is now to be applied when determining 
whether the cause of action has been established.101  The cyber bully would need to 
have communicated to at least one person other than the target defamatory material 
that is reasonably referable to the target. The publication need not refer to the target 
expressly by name but may consist of a photograph, drawing or other image or 
otherwise which may be reasonably understood as identifying him or her.  To be 
adjudged defamatory the publication needs to either: (1) expose the plaintiff to hatred, 
contempt or ridicule;102 (2) induce others to shun or avoid the plaintiff;103 or (3) lower 
the plaintiff in the estimation of others104 whilst disparaging the plaintiff in the sense 
of attributing moral blame to the plaintiff for some disagreeable conduct or 
attribute.105  It is the interpretation of ordinary, fair-minded members of society that is 
taken into account.106 
 
Importantly, the motive or actual intention of the defendant is irrelevant. Merely 
because matter is published in jest does not necessarily prevent cartoons, caricatures, 
jokes or satire from being subject to the laws of defamation. If ordinary, fair-minded 
members of society would regard the publication as trivial ridicule or good natured 
humour, there is no cause of action.107  However, if it the publication is judged to 
have gone further and derided the target, it will constitute ridicule amounting to 
defamatory material.108  Similarly, if the attempted humour suggests an underlying 
assumption of alleged truth which may be considered defamatory, then the cyber 
bully cannot claim that the publication was no more than comic nonsense.109 
 
                                                
100 Australian Law Reform Commission, above n 98, [74.117], Recommendations 74-1 and 74-2; New 
South Wales Law Reform Comission , above n 98 [7.5]. 
101 Civil Laws (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), Chap 9; Defamation Act 2005 (NSW); Defamation Act (NT); 
Defamation Act 2005 (Qld); Defamation Act 2005 (SA); Defamation Act 2005 (Tas); Defamation Act 
2005 (Vic); Defamation Act 2005 (WA). 
102 Parmiter v Coupland (1840) 6 M&W 105 at 108; 151 ER 340 at 342; Brander v Ryan (2000) 78 
SASR 234 at 245. 
103 Henry v TVW Enterprises [1990] WAR 475 (publication saying plaintiff had a contagious disease). 
104 Sim v Stretch (1936) 52 TLR 669 at 671. 
105 Sungravure Pty Ltd v Middle East Airlines Airliban SAL (1975) 134 CLR 1. 
106 Reader’s Digest Services Pty Ltd v Lamb (1982) 150 CLR 500 at 506. 
107 Donoghue v Hayes (1831) Exch 265 at 266. 
108 Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] 2 NSWLR 449; Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated 
Press (1991) 23 NSWLR 443 at 448-449. An example of a plaintiff alleging that defamation by a 
cartoon, see: Harry Seidler & Associates Pty Ltd v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1986) Aust Torts Reps 
80-002. 
109 Donoghue v Hayes (1831) Exch 265 at 266; Entienne Pty Ltd v Festival City Broadcasters Pty Ltd 
(2001) 79 SASR 19 at 28-29 (FC). 
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A cyber bully who defames his or her target will rarely if ever have a defence.  Even 
where the target has consented to good natured humour, this will not be regarded as a 
voluntary assumption of risk that the publication will convey an imputation which 
was not anticipated or will exceed that consent and amount to derision.110 
 
3.2.2 Third party liability 
Not infrequently, the perpetrator will not have sufficient resources to meet any 
compensation order made against him or her.  Notwithstanding any psychological 
benefit that might be produced by a successful claim against such a person, there 
would normally be little to be gained, and much to lose in terms of time and money, 
by pursuing such an action.  It is natural, therefore, for an aggrieved person to seek 
reparation from a third party who may be held responsible for allowing the cyber 
bullying to take place, such as the school authority in the case of cyber bullying at 
school.  Such a third party may be perceived as having ‘deep pockets’ capable of 
satisfying any judgment debt by virtue of insurance or the resources of the State. 
 
School authorities may have personal liability sheeted home to them either for 
negligence in failing to take reasonable care to prevent the cyber bullying taking place 
or for defamation by facilitating the continued publication of the defamatory material. 
 
(a) Negligence 
A negligence claim for cyber bullying may be problematic in a number of respects, 
relating to the various elements of the negligence equation.  Some of the difficulties 
are associated with the damage being of a pure psychological nature. 
 
Duty of care 
 
It is well established that school authorities owe non-delegable duties of care to their 
students. 111  These duties extend to taking reasonable precautions against not only 
physical but also psychiatric injury.112  Moreover, the duty of a school authority has 
been recognised as extending to protecting the student from the conduct of other 
students.113 However, the duty of care issue becomes more challenging in the context 
of any normal fortitude requirement and in relation to the temporal and or 
geographical scope of the duty. 
 
It is a common understanding in the community that different people have different 
resilience to stressors that may trigger psychological damage.114 Concerns that a 
defendant could be held responsible for the psychiatric injury suffered by a plaintiff 
                                                
110 Ettingshausen v Australian Consolidated Press Ltd (Unreported, New South Wales Supreme Court, 
Hunt CJ in CL, 11 March 1993); (1993) A Def R 51-065’. 
111 Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258. 
112 See, eg, Cox v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 471. 
113 New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 at 565. 
114 Chadwick v British Railways Board [1967] 1 WLR 912 at 922. 
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who was seen as being overly sensitive led to the suggestion by a succession of judges 
that, absent specific knowledge on the part of the defendant of the plaintiff’s 
excessive susceptibility, the plaintiff should be required to conform to a standard of 
normality before being entitled to compensation.115 Since those times the law has 
shown greater faith in the advances in knowledge and understanding of psychiatric 
conditions, reflected in Australia in the High Court decision Tame v New South 
Wales116 in which a majority the judges rejected the notion of a normal fortitude 
precondition.  Nevertheless, the 2002 Review of the Law of Negligence Report, which 
followed an inquiry headed by Justice Ipp, recommended prescribing ‘recognised 
psychiatric illness’ as the relevant damage, and a requirement that such injury to a person 
of normal fortitude be foreseeable (Recommendation 34).  The second part of this 
recommendation was intended to give effect to the decision in Tame v New South 
Wales117 but in fact only reflected the views of two members of the bench.118  
Nevertheless, this recommendation was enacted in all but two jurisdictions, Queensland 
and the Northern Territory.119 
 
As a result a plaintiff student who suffers psychiatric harm resulting from cyber 
bullying in an Australian jurisdiction other than Queensland or the Northern Territory 
must prove, as a positive element of his or her case, that he or she is a child of 
‘normal fortitude’.  The difficulty with this requirement lies in the fact that every 
person has his or her own breaking point to external stressors, which depends upon 
inter alia individual factors such as age, health, personality type and previous 
experiences.  There is no medical legitimacy to the concept of ‘normality’ in the 
general community.120 It is not surprising, then, that where a court considers the matter 
it cannot venture beyond psychiatrists giving evidence in the nature of ex cathedra 
assertions without any attempt at justification or explication,121 or to ‘normal 
fortitude’ being a matter of judicial notice122, or now, in McHugh J’s terms, an 
application of a community standard.123  Rather than leave the foreseeability of 
normal fortitude as a matter of such unguided intuition, the legislation follows a 
further recommendation emanating from the Ipp inquiry: that a court should take into 
account factors such as whether there was sudden shock; whether the plaintiff 
                                                
115 See, eg, Bunyan v Jordan (1937) 57 CLR 1 at 14, 18; Bourhill v Young [1943] AC 92 at 110, 117; 
Jaensch v Coffey (1984) 155 CLR 549 at 568; Wodrow v The Commonwealth (1993) 45 FCR 52 at 72-3.  
In the United States see, eg, Rodrigues v State of Hawaii, 472 P 2d 509 at 520 (Haw, 1970); Culbert v 
Sampson's Supermarkets Inc, 444 A 2d 433 at 437 (Me, 1982); Bass v Nooney Company, 646 SW 2d 765 
at 773 (Miss, 1983); Thing v La Chusa, 771 P 2d 814 at 830 (Cal, 1989); Portee v Jaffee, 417 A 2d 521 at 
528 (NJ, 1980); Gammon v Osteopathic Hospital of Maine Inc, 534 A 2d 1282 at 1285 (Me, 1987); 
Payton v Abbott Labs, 437 NE 2d 171 at 181 (Mass, 1982). 
116 (2002) 211 CLR 317 at 333 (Gleeson CJ), 343-344 (Gaudron J), 380, 384 (Gummow and Kirby JJ). 
117 David Ipp, ‘Negligence – Where Lies the Future?’ (2003) 23 Australian Bar Review 158, 163. 
118 Only McHugh and Callinan JJ favoured a pre-condition: see Callinan J in Gifford v Strang Patrick 
Stevedoring Pty Limited (2003) 214 CLR 269 at 309. 
119 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 32; Civil Liability Act 
1936 (SA), s 33; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 34; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 72; Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA), s 5S.   
120 See, eg, Judith Herman, Trauma and Recovery (1992), 58; Jay Shurley ‘Types of Psychiatric 
Disabilities Following Trauma’ (1967) 3 Lawyers' Med J 257; David Tomb, ‘The Phenomenology of Post 
Traumatic Stress Disorder’ (1994) 17 Psychiatric Clinics of North America 237, 246-7.  
121 Morgan v Tame (2000) 49 NSWLR 21.   
122 Page v Smith [1994] 4 All ER 522, 549-50 per Hoffman LJ. 
123 (2002) 211 CLR 317 at 359. McHugh J stated that normal fortitude was ‘not a matter for expert 
evidence.’ 
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witnessed, at the scene, a person being killed, injured or put in peril; any pre-existing 
relationship between plaintiff and defendant; and the nature of the relationship between 
the plaintiff and the victim killed, injured or imperilled. These factors have previously 
been considered by some courts as prerequisites for recovery for psychiatric injury,124  
a view rejected by the majority of the judges in the High Court of Australia who 
decided in Tame v New South Wales and later Gifford v Strang Stevedoring Ltd125 that 
they should be considered to be merely factors informing the reasonable foreseeability 
test. 
 
Application of these factors to an action against a school for failure to take reasonable 
care to prevent cyber bullying illustrates their shortcomings as guidelines to normal 
fortitude.  In such a case there is no ‘scene’ and ‘no victim.’126   The existence of a 
pre-existing relationship between the school and the student who has been  cyber 
bullied adds nothing to the issue, while trying to pinpoint a single ‘shocking event’ is 
inappropriate and unhelpful in a case like cyber bullying which typically involves an 
accumulation of instances of objectionable behaviour. The guidelines, therefore, offer 
little assistance, meaning that a court would be left to rely on assertion and intuition. 
Moreover, when the task is reframed in terms of a ‘normal child,’ it becomes an even 
greater challenge.  The same question arises as in the case of face-to-face bullying: 
what degree of resilience might be expected of a child when school years are the main 
formative time of a young person’s life and some forms of aggressive interaction are 
beneficial to the healthy development of a person who is able to cope with the 
pressures and demands of living in a modern society. 
 
By contrast, Queensland and the Northern Territory continue to apply the common 
law approach supported by the majority of the judges in Tame v New South Wales.  
Under this approach, the defendant will owe a duty of care unless the plaintiff's 
reaction to the bullying is beyond the bounds of reasonable foreseeability.  This will 
likely to only be in an extreme case, of a kind on which most would agree.   
 
The other difficulty posed by cases of cyber bullying is in relation to be temporal and 
geographical scope of the non-delegable duty.  In Australia it was been held in Geyer 
v Downs that the existence of the duty depends upon ‘whether in the particular 
circumstances the relationship of school teacher and pupil was or was not been in 
existence.’127  This test was developed in the context of a school principal who, for 
the safety of students arriving at the school gate prior to school hours, allowed 
students to enter school grounds but directed that those arriving before 9:00am were 
not permitted to play games or run about and instead were to occupy themselves in 
sitting down and reading or talking quietly. The principal's appreciation of the risk of 
injury and his direction concerning permissible behaviour were held to give rise to the 
relevant relationship.  There is little doubt, therefore, that the existence of the 
relationship does not depend upon the student being on school premises or whether 
                                                
124 Des Butler, Damages for Psychiatric Injuries (Annandale, NSW : Federation Press, 2004), ch 
5. 
125 (2003) 214 CLR 269. 
126 Unless the plaintiff is another student who claims to have been traumatised by the cyber bullying of 
a fellow student.  Such a claim is outside the scope of this article. 
127 (1977) 138 CLR 91 at 94. 
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the injury occurs during school hours.  For example, it was held by the New South 
Wales Court of Appeal in Trustees of the Roman Catholic Church for the Diocese of 
Bathurst v Koffman that a duty of care arose in a case where a 12 year old school boy 
was injured in an incident involving older students despite the incident occurring 20 
minutes after the end of the school day and 400 metres from school grounds.128  
Indeed, in the same case Shellar JA went so far as to say that, depending on the 
circumstances, the duty could extend to pupils bullied on the journey on the bus or 
while they were walking to or from school.  Thus, if the school authority ‘were aware 
… that on a particular journey older children habitually and violently bullied younger 
children, the duty may well extend so far as to require the school to take preventative 
steps or to warn parents. This duty would be founded in the relationship of teacher 
and pupil.’129 
 
There will be no doubt that the scope of a school’s duty will embrace cyber bullying 
by students using mobile phones while they are at school, or via a website, blog or 
wiki hosted on a school server during school hours using school computers. However, 
the duty is likely to extend further.  It may embrace cyber bullying which involves 
contributions to a school-hosted website, blog, or wiki which is accessed remotely by 
a student, perhaps from home or some other location away from school premises. 
Such an extension would be justified by factors such as the school’s control over the 
hosting sever and its grant of remote access to a student user under instructions or 
conditions of use as being indicia that the relationship of teacher and pupil was in 
existence in the circumstances, irrespective of the time or place the website, blog, or 
wiki is being accessed.  For the same reasons the relationship may also exist where 
students use school computers on school premises, whether during school hours or 
not, to access sites hosted on third party servers (such as a Myspace or Facebook 
profile or the like).  
 
There may be more borderline cases, such as where a cyber bully uses his or her 
mobile phone while on school premises to bully a fellow student who is not on the 
premises, or while the target is on school premises but the cyber bully is not. In the 
former, but not the latter, it might be possible to argue that if there are rules 
concerning the use of mobile phones while on school premises then those directions 
as to conduct are indicative of a relationship of school teacher and pupil being in 
existence.  If the school were aware of habitual cyber bullying taking place in such a 
manner, it might be that such cases have features similar to the extension suggested 
by Shellar JA in the Koffman case. 
 
By contrast, other instances of cyber bullying may be seen as occurring outside the 
ambit of the relationship.   For example, a student who is bullied by a fellow student 
using a mobile phone or on-line where both are at home occurs at a time when the 
relationship of teacher and pupil is not in existence and must necessarily be the 
concern of parents or, if need be, the police.  The mere fact that the cyber bully and 
his or her target attend the same school will not be sufficient to bring such a case 
within the ambit of the school authority's duty of care. 
                                                
128 (1996) Aust Torts Reports 81-399, 63,597. 
129 (1996) Aust Torts Reports 81-399, 63,597. 
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Standard of care   
Cyber bullying poses further challenges in relation to the required standard of care, 
and determining breach.  Once the duty was thought of in terms of ‘such care … as a 
careful father would take of his boys,’130 but such a standard is unrealistic for a 
principal in charge of a large number of students.131 It also does not reflect the fact 
that teachers today normally have tertiary qualifications, which may mean that in a 
given situations the degree of care that may be reasonably expected may be greater or 
less than the care of a ‘careful parent’.  Today the duty is recognised as being the care 
that would be exercised by a reasonable teacher or school. Legislation now reflects 
the common law position that this involves two questions: (1) was the risk of injury 
was reasonably foreseeable in the circumstances, in the sense that the risk was “not 
insignificant”? and (2) what precautions (if any) would a reasonable person have 
taken to avoid that risk in the circumstances – taking into account the probability that 
harm would occur absent care, the likely seriousness of that harm, the burden of taking 
precautions, and the social utility of the risk-creating activity.132   
 
In addition, many jurisdictions have provided that when deciding what would be a 
reasonable response to a risk, the court is to defer to a ‘responsible body’ of expert 
opinion ‘unless no reasonable court would do so.’133 As a consequence, in these 
jurisdictions the accepted practices in the teaching profession will, unless deemed to be 
unreasonable, be the best guide to the standard of care that may be expected from a 
reasonable teacher or school authority.  This may prove to be significant in the case of 
cyber bullying.  Thus, for example, accepted practice among the teaching profession 
would undoubtedly include having a policy governing the use of school ICT equipment 
and an anti-bullying policy which specifically refers to cyber bullying and is zero 
tolerance.  Such policies should extend to the time the relevant relationship is in 
existence, whether the perpetrator is physically located on school premises or not. 
Further, merely having such a policy would be insufficient if students are not repeatedly 
reminded of its existence.  Moreover, complaints would need to be taken seriously and 
investigated properly by those charged with that responsibility, normally principals or 
deputy principals.134 If remedial action is required then it must be taken and applied in 
a consistent fashion so that potential cyber bullies do not think that such a policy is 
zero tolerance in name only. ‘Accepted practice’ would also likely include supervision 
and monitoring of the use of computer equipment on school premises, as well as 
monitoring and exercising prudent editorial control over any website, blogs, wikis or  
similar forum that the school is hosting.  On the other hand, while it is not uncommon 
for schools today to ban the use of mobile phones during school hours on school 
property, there may be a question whether this precaution is so widespread that it can be 
said to presently reflect ‘accepted practice’ in the teaching profession.   
                                                
130 Williams v Eady (1893) 10 TLR 41 at 42. 
131 Geyer v Downs (1977) 138 CLR 91at 102. 
132 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 42-43; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5B; Civil Liability 
Act 2003 (Qld), s 9; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), ss 31-32; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 11; 
Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 48; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5B. 
133 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5O; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 22; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA), s 41; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 22; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 59. Cf Civil Liability Act 
2002 (WA), s 5PB which only applies to medical professionals 
134 Cf Cox v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 471. 
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Even if a school authority takes such precautions as may be deemed to form part of 
the accepted practice of the teaching profession in response to cyber bullying, and 
thereby satisfy its duty of care, there is no certainty that such bullying behaviour will 
be eradicated.  For example, there may be content, such as nicknames, abbreviated 
communications or other obscure references which may constitute cyber bullying but 
not be recognisable as such without a proper understanding of the full context of the 
communication.  Further, subtle forms of cyber bullying may be near impossible to 
detect such as an electronic ‘sending to Coventry’ by deliberately refusing to 
acknowledge a particular person’s contributions to a discussion forum, blog or wiki. 
 
 Causation  
The State/Territory civil liability legislation has enacted the common law position that 
the plaintiff must show that his or her injury would not have occurred but for the 
specific breach of duty by the defendant.135  Accordingly, it would be insufficient to 
merely identify a breach of duty by the school such as a failure to supervise school 
computer equipment if that failure to supervise did not materially contribute to the 
plaintiff’s injury. 
 
A further difficulty may be that many of the symptoms of the types of psychiatric 
injury that may be caused by cyber bullying, such as mood swings, depression, 
anxiety and poor academic results might in a given case be experienced by an 
adolescent as a result of a variety of causes, including simply those associated with 
growing up or as the result of unrelated upheaval in the family situation like parents 
divorcing, and not as the consequence of bullying behaviour.  There can sometimes be 
a tendency, conscious or subconscious, for a child plaintiff or his or her family to 
attribute all ailments of a psychological or psychosomatic nature to the cyber 
bullying. This will include cases where the child is situated within a family which is 
otherwise beset by depression, such that he or she may even be genetically 
predisposed to depression or other psychological disorders136 or where the child’s 
family consciously or subconsciously encourages him or her to adopt a ‘sick role’ in 
the hope of attracting monetary compensation.137 
 
A court will therefore be faced with the threshold task distinguishing between 
psychological or psychosomatic injuries linked to the breach of duty and those 
resulting from other causes.138 It will be sufficient, however, if the plaintiff is able to 
show that the school’s failure to prevent the cyber bullying in breach of its duty of 
care was one of the material causes of the resulting psychological harm rather than, 
for example, the sole or dominant cause. 
 
                                                
135 Civil Law (Wrongs) Act 2002 (ACT), s 45; Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5D; Civil Liability Act 
2003 (Qld), s 11; Civil Liability Act 1936 (SA), s 34; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 13; Wrongs Act 
1958 (Vic), s 51; Civil Liability Act 2002 (WA), s 5C. 
136 Cox v New South Wales [2007] NSWSC 471. 
137 Nader v Urban Transit Authority of New South Wales (1985) 2 NSWLR 501. 
138 Bradford-Smart v West Sussex County Council [2002] ELR 139 (CA). 
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Defences  
Clearly, the mere use of ICT equipment by a school student will not amount to a student 
being volens to the risk of being cyber bullied.  Thus, if the school is to have any 
defence it will rest with contributory negligence.  The six States have now prescribed 
that contributory negligence is to be determined using a similar approach as that used 
to determine a defendant’s negligence.  In other words, it calls for a determination of 
whether the risk was reasonable foreseeable and what precautions a reasonable person 
would take (if any) to that risk, taking into account the probability that harm would 
occur absent care, the likely seriousness of that harm, the burden of taking precautions, 
and the social utility of the risk-creating activity.139  In the Territories the common law 
prevails, so that contributory negligence is a question of whether the plaintiff took 
sufficient precautions for his or her own safety.140 
 
Like the question of normal fortitude, contributory negligence involves a 
determination of the reaction of a ‘reasonable child’ and the precautions that such a 
mythical creature would take in response to a foreseeable risk. 
 
At first glance, it might be suggested that a reasonable person who is being subjected 
to bullying using technology might be expected to take practical precautions in 
response to the risk of injury including the cessation of his or her own use of the 
technology, reporting the cyber bullying to the relevant authority and perhaps seeking 
professional assistance to address any psychiatric symptoms. However, the question 
takes on added difficulty when considered in the context of the cyber bullying of a 
school student.  In the first place, children will normally have a reduced capacity to 
appreciate the risk of injury, or the measures to take to minimise such injury should it 
occur.141  In addition, it is important to not divorce the case from its context.  In New 
South Wales v Griffin142, a case in which the child plaintiff was injured in a 
schoolyard brawl, it was argued on behalf of the defendant that, even as a 13 year old, 
the plaintiff ought to have appreciated that the fight was against school rules and that 
there was a real risk of being hurt. However, the New South Wales Court of Appeal 
declared such thinking to be divorced from the reality of the situation and what should 
be expected of a 13 year old boy. In particular, it was held that the particular pressures 
and influences that may affect such a child’s judgment should not be discounted. In 
this case there had been an excited expectation that the fight would take place which 
had permeated throughout the school (including a general invitation being written on 
one of the class blackboards). Peer pressure on the plaintiff had been very strong.  
Accordingly, to suggest that in such circumstances he would not turn up for the fight 
was ‘quite unreasonable’ because he would have become notorious throughout the 
                                                
139 Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW), s 5R; Civil Liability Act 2003 (Qld), s 23; Civil Liability Act 1936 
(SA), s 44; Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s 23; Wrongs Act 1958 (Vic), s 62; Civil Liability Act 2002 
(WA), s 5K. 
140 Commissioner of Railway v Ruprecht (1979) 142 CLR 563 at 570. 
141 McHale v Watson (1966) 115 CLR 199 at 214-15 (‘deficiencies of foresight and prudence that are 
normal during childhood’). 
142 [2004] NSWCA 17. 
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school and would have had to face the charge of cowardice.143  Instead, the plaintiff‘s 
behaviour fell within ‘the foreseeable folly of youthful exuberance.’144  
 
It may be unrealistic, therefore, to regard a student who has been cyber bullied has 
been contributory negligent if, for example, he or she fails to report the matter to his 
or her parents or some other authority figure such as a school teacher or police officer.  
In its context, the target may consider that complaining would be likely to invite 
further, possibly more intense, hostility from the perpetrator.  There may be an 
additional fear that parents or teachers who do not properly understand but who mean 
well might react by removing the target’s own cherished access to the technology, in 
effect punishing the target himself or herself a second time.  In the eyes of an 
adolescent who has the misfortune of being targeted by a cyber bully, the best course 
of action in the circumstances might instead be to do nothing and say nothing and 
endure the hostility in the hope that it will eventually subside.  Taken in its context, 
such a response should not be held to amount to contributory negligence on the part of 
the target.145 
 
(b) Defamation 
In Byrne v Deane146 it was held that anyone who, whilst not the original statement 
maker, becomes aware of a defamatory statement posted on his or her property and, 
while having the authority and capacity to terminate the publication, fails to do so is 
regarded as having republished the defamatory material and will incur personal 
liability for that publication. This doctrine has been extended to computer sites where 
the host of the site has editorial control.147  Accordingly, school authorities who 
exercise editorial control over the computer sites they host must act promptly, upon 
becoming aware of potentially defamatory material having been posted on the site in 
order, to ensure that the offending material is taken down. 148 
 
 
4. Cyber bullying as vilification 
 
If the cyber bullying behaviour takes the form a widespread attack on the target on the 
basis of his or her race, ethnic group or religion, it may be possible for the target to 
have recourse to anti-vilification legislation in order to obtain a remedy. Most 
Australian jurisdictions also prohibit racial vilification, although there are differences 
in the formulations. The Commonwealth Racial Discrimination Act 1975, s 18C 
prohibits any act, other than a private act, which is reasonably likely in all the 
                                                
143 New South Wales v Griffin [2004] NSWCA 17 at  [9]-[10]. 
144 The Commonwealth v Introvigne (1982) 150 CLR 258 at 280. 
145 Cf Copping v The State of South Australia (1997) 192 LSJS 109 (9 year old’s failure to leave the 
vicinity of where senior students were throwing stones at younger students held to amount to a failure 
to take reasonable care for his own safety). 
146 [1937] 1 KB 818 at 829. 
147 Stratton Oakmont Inc v Prodigy Services Inc,  23 Media L. Rep. 1794 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.,  1995); cf 
Cubby Inc v CompuServe Inc, 776 F Supp 135 (SDNY, 1991). 
148 Cf Bishop v New South Wales [2000] NSWSC 1042. 
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circumstances to offend, incite, humiliate, or intimidate another because of the other 
person’s race, colour or national or ethnic origin.  The corresponding prohibition in 
State/Territory legislation is against vilification in the form of a public act which 
incites hatred towards, serious contempt for, or severe ridicule of, a person or group 
of persons on the ground of the race (as broadly defined).149 Breach of these 
provisions may be pursued as a civil claim.   There is also a criminal offence at the 
State/Territory level of serious racial vilification, which involves threats, or 
incitement of threats, or physical harm towards the person or property of another.150  
In addition, New South Wales, Queensland and Tasmania have outlawed the public 
incitement of hatred, contempt or ridicule on the grounds of a person's sexual 
orientation, sexuality or transgender identity.151   
 
The requirement of an ‘act other than a private act’ or ‘public act’ means that the 
legislation will not apply to hostile behaviour directed solely at the target, such as an 
SMS message on the target's mobile phone.  It would, however, embrace messages 
uploaded onto the Internet.  Further, the word ‘incite’ in the State statutes is given its 
dictionary meaning of urging or stimulating action.  It has been held in a different 
context that screaming of abuse, even of vile abuse, is insufficient to constitute an 
incitement of hatred, contempt or ridicule for the purposes of the Act.152  Accordingly, 
for example, depending on the language and context, aggressive behaviour in the form 
of homophobic name-calling may not be sufficient to amount to vilification even in 
these three jurisdictions.  These limitations aside, whether there has been a breach of 
any of these prohibitions is determined objectively, and is not reliant on the subjective 
feelings or sensitivities of an aggrieved person.153 Further, the context in which the act 
occurs is an important consideration.154  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
Cyber bullying is a growing phenomenon, particularly among ‘Generation Y’ – the 
natives of the digital age.  Cyber bullying shares many attributes with face-to-face 
bullying, including the power imbalance and the target’s feelings of helplessness and 
inability to defend himself or herself, but introduces further dimensions such as the 
ability to reach the target had any time and anywhere and the perceived anonymity of 
the perpetrator. 
                                                
149 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), s 66; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 20C; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 124A; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), s 19(a). See also Racial 
Vilification Act 1996 (SA), s 4; Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic), s 7. Cf Criminal Code 
(WA), ss 77-78. 
150 Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT), s 67; Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), s 20D; Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), s 131A; Racial Vilification Act 1996 (SA), s 4; Anti-Discrimination Act 
1998 (Tas), s 19(a); Racial and Religious Tolerance Act 2001 (Vic), s 24. 
151 Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW), ss 38R-T, 49ZS-TA; Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld), ss 
124A, 131A; Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas), s 19(c). 
152 Burns v Dye [2002] NSWADT 32, [87].  Cf however Peters v Constance [2005] QADT 9 where in 
a short judgment it was held that yelling ‘paedophile’ at a homosexual amounted to vilification. 
153 See, eg, Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615. 
154 See, eg, Hagan v Trustees of the Toowoomba Sports Ground Trust [2000] FCA 1615. 
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Despite a variety of strategies, face-to-face bullying remains prevalent in our schools.  
Cyber bullying has now emerged as a further challenge confronting today’s young 
people.  The invocation of the law may seem an extreme response to behaviour which 
the perpetrator may view as merely having fun.  However, the serious harm that may 
result from cyber bullying may mean that the intervention of  criminal, civil and/or 
vilification laws is appropriate.  However, the extra dimensions that technology offers 
for a bully, combined with the psychological nature of the harm that it produces, can 
have an adverse impact upon the effectiveness of the law as a means of redress for the 
targets of cyber bullying. 
 
 
